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Introduction 
 
In a recent article on sectarian conflict and family law in Egypt, Saba Mahmood 
questions some well-rooted assumptions regarding the genealogy of family codes 
in post-colonial settings (in the Middle-East in particular). According to Mahmood, 
the persistence of religious-based family law in countries with majoritarian Muslim 
populations has been considered mostly a sign of these populations’ backwardness 
and incomplete secularization, as well as the result of colonial policies’ incapacity 
to interfere “in the religious affairs of colonized peoples”.1 Yet, she continues, 
these assumptions are fundamentally flawed. Indeed, it was precisely under 
colonization that religion, family issues and sexuality were relegated by colonial 
powers in the private sphere. “The privatization of these aspects of social life (…) 
[meant that] they came to be increasingly regulated by the centralized state and its 
various political rationalities (no longer administered by local muftis, qadis, 
customary norms, and parochial moral knowledges)”.2 In other words, under the 
modern colonial state, family law became “one of the techniques of modern 
governance and sexual regulation. Family law as a distinct legal domain is a 
modern invention that did not exist in its present form in the premodern period”.3 
Muslims’ family law has been increasingly under the spotlight in recent 
years, particularly in the European ex-metropoles. Practices like polygamy and the 
wearing of veils by Muslim women are considered symbols of entrenched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mahmood 2012, p. 57. 
2 Ibid, p. 58. 
3 Ibid, p. 58. 
patriarchy and lack of modernization, as well as remnants of regulations regarding 
women’s sexuality in particular that emanate exclusively from religion. In the 
attempt to eliminate them from public and private life, from the mid-2000s 
onwards European governments have issued new policies on so-called ‘civic 
integration’ specifically addressing the migrant Muslim family. These policies’ 
main aim is to expunge certain practices and ‘behaviours’ – related to parenting, 
the sexual division of labour and gender relations – from the private sphere 
altogether. Under the label of ‘civic integration programmes’ several countries 
across Europe have thus implemented regulations that have the explicit goal to 
subtract Muslim migrant women from the backward worlds in which they are 
deemed to live; that is, to ‘emancipate’ them. In France and the Netherlands for 
instance, new integration rhetorics, materials and courses have been produced with 
the goal to instruct Muslim migrant women in particular on their ‘civil rights’ and 
to promote gender equality above all in the family – considered the locus of 
misogyny par excellence. In France the High Council for Integration (HCI) [Haut 
Conseil a l’integration], considered “the application of the law of nationality in 
matters of personal status and bilateral agreements”4 as the most pressing problem 
for women limiting their rights. The position of the HCI reflects a common trope in 
Western discussions on legal pluralism and its consequences for minorities and 
women’s rights, one within which gender oppression and gender violence are 
related to religious law with the effect of producing, as Büchler puts it, “a binary 
opposition between culture and religion on the one hand and human rights and 
gender equality on the other”.5  In the Netherlands the right-wing nationalist 
Minister Rita Verdonk – the main initiator of the civic integration turn in the 
country – defended the civic integration policies as aimed to protect Dutch 
progressive norms regarding sexuality and women’s rights from backward family 
values. As Sarah van Walsum aptly noted, “in linking exotic family norms and 
immigration to formulate a compound threat to the Dutch nation, (…) [Verdonk’s] 
words were in fact strikingly reminiscent (…) of the discourse used in colonial 
times to distinguish the Dutch, legally defined as ‘European’, from the ‘native’ 
inhabitants of the former Dutch East Indies” (van Walsum 2008: 6). 
Taking all this into account, I argue that in focussing upon the family as the 
site of the privatization of religion and thus of unequal gender relations, and in 
targeting migrant Muslim women in particular as the main recipients of the new 
‘civilizing missions’, the recent civic integration policies are animated by an older 
colonial anxiety. Albeit presented as the landmarks of emancipation and integration 
for Muslim women, these policies in fact re-produce in the context of the 
metropoles the conditions both for the portrayal of Muslim family law as the 
exclusive emanation of an ancient backward culture and religion, and for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 HCI 2003, p. 46. 
5 Büchler, 2012, p. 208.  
identification of women as the main victims of gender inequality in their 
communities. 
In order to shed light on these factors, this article firstly, will illustrate the 
main components of the new civic integration policies in the Netherlands and 
France highlighting in particular their gender dimensions. By focusing upon such 
dimensions we will see how the migrant family has become the central target of 
these new efforts at ‘assimilating’ migrants, particularly women. Secondly, I will 
disclose the deep-rooted colonial heritage that informs the emphasis upon gender 
equality and the family in both the French and the Dutch contexts. In particular, I 
will show how such a colonial heritage is visible precisely in the identification of 
the private sphere as the last bastion of Muslim migrants’ identity, which therefore 
must be dispossessed. 
 
Civic integration in the Netherlands. 
 
The Netherlands was the first EU country to pass new regulations on 
migrants integration known as ‘civic integration policies’, that is, policies that 
make the granting of a visa to new migrants conditional upon their demonstration 
of knowledge of the language, history and values of the host country. In December 
2005, the Balkenende II cabinet, with right-wing nationalist Rita Verdonk among 
its ministers, passed a law on Civic Integration Abroad [Wet inburgering in het 
buitenland – Wib] – which came into force in 2006. The new law required migrants 
seeking to migrate to the Netherlands for family reunification or for religious 
services to demonstrate a basic knowledge of the Dutch language and of Dutch 
society prior to their arrival in the country. According to the new provisions, 
integration became a pre-condition for admission into the country, particularly for 
certain types of migrants. As Bonjour and Lettinga report, in the parliamentary 
discussions from 2004 onwards, the government referred to certain categories of 
family migrants as “unfit” for Dutch society. “An important part of these [family 
migrants] has characteristics that are adverse to a good integration into Dutch 
society. Most prominent among these (…) is the group of marriage migrants from 
Turkey and Morocco”. 6  The selective intent of the policies was concretely 
implemented by making the Civic Integration Abroad test compulsory for all 
except family members from western nations: EU/EEA citizens, and those from 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, South Korea, the United States 
of America and the Vatican City. Furthermore, family members of persons holding 
a visa permit for high-skilled workers (‘Blue Card’) were not required to take the 
exam abroad. In short, the restrictions on family reunification conveyed by these 
rules did not apply to western nationals, “nor to migrants occupying a privileged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bonjour and Lettinga, 2012, p. 269. 
position on the transnational labour market”.7 In January 2007 a new law followed, 
i.e., the Civic Integration Act [Wet inburgering – Wi], regulating the integration 
procedure upon arrival in the Netherlands. The new law aimed to strengthen the 
‘civic integration’ components of the previous 1998 law that had established 
mandatory participation in language courses for newcomers, but without testing the 
outcome. Instead, the 2007 law applied a new definition of integration 
[inburgering] in which participation in courses was no longer sufficient; in the new 
legislation, integration, which is defined as knowledge of Dutch society and 
language, needs to be demonstrated through an exam result. 8  
The Civic Integration Exam abroad is divided into three parts, aiming at 
examining knowledge of Dutch society [Kennis van de Nederlandse Samenleving – 
KNS], language skills in spoken Dutch [Gesproken Nederlands – TGN], and the 
understanding of written Dutch [Geletterdheid en Begrijpend Lezen – GBL]. In 
order to pass the pre-integration test abroad, applicants are invited to acquire a self-
study kit (which costs 110 Euros), which contains self-study materials aimed at 
enabling the applicants to familiarize themselves with the exam requirements. 
Migrants who pass the exam abroad and receive the Provisional Residence Permit 
[mvv – machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf] in their country of origin and then in the 
Netherlands must pass the Civic Integration Exam in the Netherlands within three-
and-a-half years of arrival, in order to obtain a residence permit. The Civic 
Integration Exam in the Netherlands is compulsory for all foreigners, with 
exceptions made for minors and the elderly, EU citizens, and people who lived in 
the Netherlands for eight years or more before the age of sixteen. The Integration 
Exam consists of two parts, a practical part and a central part. The practical part of 
the exam evaluates the language skills of the applicant as well as his/her ability to 
arrange life in the Netherlands.9 The central part includes an electronic practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 van Walsum, 2008. 
8 As Kirk explains, “after 1998, the scope of inburgering policies were expanded to 
include resident immigrants, in particular the unemployed and ‘caring parents’ (i.e. 
mothers). Mothers and clergy (i.e. imams) – who were brought under the Win in 2001 – 
were seen as important target groups because of their role in integrating others. Just as 
immigrant related policies prior to the 1980s had been different for different ethnic groups, 
inburgering came to mean different things for different social groups: immigrant 
categorisation was no longer based on ethnicity but on societal function” (Kirk, 2010). 
9 In order to prepare for the final exam migrants have to follow civic integration courses on 
the Dutch language and Dutch society. This part constitutes half of the content of the 
course and is common to all applicants. The other half instead is more personalized and 
consists in choosing a ‘portfolio’, already during registration. There are four portfolios 
available: work [Werk]; education, health, and upbringing [Onderwijs, gezondheid en 
opvoeding – OGO]; societal participation [Maatschappelijke participatie – MP]; and 
entrepreneurship [ondernemerschap]. According to Kirk and Suvarieriol (2013), the first 
two are the most popular. 
exam, an oral Dutch-language test and a test for knowledge about Dutch society.10 
The passing of the exam is certified by an integration diploma, which enables the 
migrant to apply for a permanent residence permit. Unlike in the case of the Civic 
Integration Exam Abroad, there is no official self-study package for preparing for 
the civic integration exam, so migrants must rely on one of the many study-kits 
available on the market at their own expense. 
The new civic integration programs have put enormous emphasis upon 
gender equality, presented as a pillar value of the Dutch social contract. Such 
emphasis is readily detectable in both the materials used for the Civic Integration 
Exam Abroad as well as in those used for the exam required within three and a half 
years of the migrant’s acceptance in the country. Concerning the exam abroad, one 
of the most important documents for the preparation of the exam is the movie 
‘Going to the Netherlands’ [Naar Nederland]. The movie is included in the official 
self-study package with the same title, which migrants abroad must acquire in 
order to prepare for the exam.11 ‘Going to the Netherlands’ deals with different 
aspects of life in the destination country – history, customs, health, work, children, 
language and the exam itself – emphasizing quite strongly the difficulties of 
integrating and, thus, the importance of the migrant’s good will.12 Throughout the 
movie, mentions of gender equality as a key value of Dutch society are very 
frequent. For instance, the movie shows topless women sunbathing on Dutch 
beaches, or pictures of women in bikinis to convey the message that Dutch women 
enjoy sexual freedom and that nudity is not taboo. In one scene images of a man 
undertaking domestic chores in the kitchen are accompanied by the narration, 
“Don’t be surprised if you see a man standing at the cooker with an apron on 
because in many families men and women fulfill the same roles”. In another 
section, the narrator stresses how behaviors that migrants might consider culture-
based, like genital mutilations, or private business, like domestic violence, are 
forbidden by Dutch law and severely sanctioned in the country. But the longest 
sections of the movie, conveying clear messages addressed to migrant women, 
concern children, education and work. These sections are designed to convey the 
message that the best parents, especially mothers, in the Netherlands are those who 
teach their children that the learning process can be playful and enjoyable. As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The electronic practical exam consists of an interview with a computer in which the 
immigrant is asked questions about Dutch society. Usually it consists of 43 questions that 
have to be completed in one hour. 73% have to be answered correctly. The civic 
component of the test is also done through a computer. In 45 minutes applicants are shown 
a number of short films, after which they have to answer 62% of around 43 questions 
correctly in order to pass. 
11 Information on the procedure for the examination abroad and the self-study material is 
available at an apposite website: http://www.naarnederland.nl/en/the-examination-package 
(Last accessed in March 18, 2014). 
12 On these aspects see Suvarierol, 2012. 
narrator explicitly says, normal families in the Netherlands are nuclear ones, 
composed of two parents or sometimes just one, but not enlarged families. 
Furthermore, the best upbringing comes from a mother – and it is especially 
mothers who are here addressed – who gets involved in her children’s education by 
going into the school, engaging in its activities and talking to the teachers. This 
whole message is conveyed by showing the example of a young mother of 
Moroccan origin who wears a scarf and organizes play-time in her child’s school. 
All in all, whereas equality between women and men is foregrounded as an 
achievement that belongs to the fabric of Dutch society, seemingly in opposition to 
non-western cultures where it is often explicitly assumed to be neglected, migrant 
women are also sent contradictory messages in which they are encouraged to be 
both emancipated and good mothers. Such an ambivalence, as we will see shortly, 
traverses the whole civic integration program. 
In her presentation of the Civic Integration Abroad Act [Wib] in 2005, the 
Minister for Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk stressed that the primary 
goal of the law was “the emancipation of women”.13 This objective had been 
behind the same minister’s 2003 creation of the Commission for the Participation 
of Ethnic Minority Women, or PAVEM [Participatie van Vrouwen uit Etnische 
Minderheden], which had the goal of elaborating policies to tackle the alleged 
“isolated position of women from ethnic minorities” in Dutch society. However, as 
Kirk notes, “the guiding philosophy behind the efforts of the committee was ‘If you 
educate a mother, you educate a family’”.14 The main target of the PAVEM, and of 
the civic integration policies, was in fact migrant and ethnic minority women qua 
mothers. Although the requirements for family reunification set by Dutch law 
under the Civic Integration Abroad Act [Wib], have had as one of their goals 
reducing the number of family members, most of them women, coming from 
abroad,15 the pragmatic approach of the Dutch new provision on integration on 
incoming migrant women was to target them as key mediators in the integration of 
the second generations: that is, to teach them how to become good mothers. The 
gendering of the civic integration turn by means of the targeting of migrant women 
as mothers had its roots in the conviction that migrant childrens’ poor educational 
and work outcomes were due to their mothers’ supposedly poor societal integration 
and Muslim background.16 By the same token, family members applying for 
reunification in the Netherlands, had to be obliged to acquire a certain degree of 
integration, as knowledge of Dutch language and society, in order for the country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Cit. in Kirk and Suvarierol, 2013, p. 7. 
14 Kirk, 2010, p. 158. 
15 In the 2000s the phenomenon of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants 
marrying women from the countries of origin of their parents, rather than Dutch women, 
was termed “import brides”. These were depicted as arranged marriages, and women were 
thus portrayed as victims of unwanted unions. 
16 Bonjour and de Hart, 2013. 
to avoid importing “bad mothers”.17 In this way, as Kirk and Suvarieriol note, the 
“‘culturalization’ of the integration debate resulted in more emphasis being placed 
on issues in the private realm, such as family, sexuality, dress, and violence against 
women”.18 
The focus upon the migrant family and migrant women qua mothers as key 
agents of integration is clear in the integration exam, which migrants must 
undertake within three years and half from their arrival in the Netherlands. The 
practical part of the exam is of particular interest here. One of the ways this part 
can be passed is through evidence collection, that is, through the preparation of a 
portfolio demonstrating the migrant’s knowledge of the Dutch language and 
society. Although in principle migrants can choose the subject on which they 
prepare their portfolio, they are often directed down specific paths during the initial 
intake meeting at the municipality where they are assigned for their exam.19 
Interestingly, the portfolio “Education, Health and Parenting”, or OGO [Onderwijs, 
Gezondheid en Opvoeding], which covers topics illustrating good parenting models 
and requires the collection of documents demonstrating the fulfilment of good 
parenting tasks, is attended mostly by women. “As such, not only are the OGO 
tasks defined as women’s tasks, but the contents of this portfolio mainly prepares 
migrant women to assume roles as mothers”.20 In the practical civic integration 
exam [Electronisch Praktijk Examen, EPE] many of the same themes concerning 
good parenting are repeated and visually represented by women, thereby 
supporting the idea that parenting is, in the end, women’s job. As Kirk rightly 
emphasized, ultimately the emancipation of migrant women, “is understood as a 
means to improve the socio-economic performance of second generation 
immigrants through educated mothering and a way to ameliorate social decay in 
migrant neighborhoods through women’s participation in civil society. Women are 
thus addressed as mothers (…) not as individual political and social actors. The 
quality of a woman’s citizenship is largely determined by her performance as a 
parent and as a neighbor, while that of her husband is measured by his labor market 
participation”.21 Though presented as a tool to promote the equality between 
women and men and the emancipation of migrant women, the Dutch civic 
integration infrastructure in fact supports a traditional and rather unequal idea of 
the sexual division of labor and, ultimately, womanhood. 
 
Civic integration in France. 
 
As in the Netherlands, in France too with the adoption in 2006 of a new law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Bonjour and de Hart, 2013. 
18 Kirk and Suvarieriol, 2013, p. 8. 
19 Kirk and Suvarieriol, 2013. 
20 Kirk and Suvarieriol 2013, p. 24. 
21 Kirk, 2010, p. 15. Van Den Berg and Duyvendak, 2012. 
on immigration and integration, 22  demonstration of mastery of French and 
knowledge of the country’s history, institutions and values has become mandatory 
for acquiring legal residence in the country. The new law, proposed by the then 
Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP), sought to redesign French legislation 
concerning immigration and integration in three directions: (a) to adopt the strategy 
of “chosen, or selective immigration” [immigration choisie] as opposed to 
“inflicted immigration” [immigration subie] and to favour the entry of high-skilled 
migrants; (b) to promote mandatory “republican integration” [intégration 
républicaine] for potential long-term residents through the establishment of the 
Contract for Reception and Integration [Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration – CAI]; 
(c) to adopt the strategy of co-development to achieve ‘true partnership’ with the 
countries of origin in migration management. This law was followed in November 
2007,23 by two new provisions: the first establishes an integration contract for the 
family within the framework of family reunification [Contract d’Accueil et 
d’Integration pour la Famille – CAIF], and the second introduces mandatory civic 
integration in the country of origin for family members seeking to join their 
relatives in France. 
The main novelty introduced by the 2006 law is the mandatory signing of the 
Contract of Reception and Integration [Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration - CAI]. 
Already established in 2003 on a voluntary basis, since 2006 third-country 
nationals who intend to settle in France have to sign a contract with the state in 
order to obtain legal residency for up to four years before they can be granted 
permanent residence and become candidates for naturalization. The contract 
applies to all foreigners with the exception of nationals of European Union states, 
of the European Economic Area and of the Swiss Confederation; of foreigners who 
have been educated for at least three years in a French secondary education 
institution overseas; and of foreigners between the age of sixteen and eighteen born 
in France to foreign parents who already live in France, or whose stable residence 
has been in France for at least five years since the age of eleven. Since 2007 the 
signing of the CAI has been preceded by civic integration evaluation in the country 
of origin. The civic integration abroad evaluation applies only to family members 
seeking to join their spouses, partners or parents living in France for at least one 
year. It consists of an assessment of their language skills and knowledge of 
republican values. If their language skills are deemed insufficient, the applicant is 
obliged to attend language courses, provided by the French state for free. Since 
2007, if the applicant is a spouse and a parent, as well as the CAI both family 
members have had to sign a contract designed specifically for parents [Contract 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Law N. 2006-911 of 24 July 2006. The text of the law is available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000266495&dateT
exte=&categorieLien=id  (Last accessed March 18, 2014). 
23 Law N. 2007-1631, of 20 November 2007 on immigration, integration and asylum, J.O.  
N. 270. 
d’Accueil et d’Integration pour la Famille – CAIF]. By signing it they commit to 
attend a one-day training session concerning the rights and duties of parenthood in 
France. 
The emphasis upon gender equality as a key component of migrants’ 
integration in the country was a very foundational moment of the design of the 
whole civic integration project from the outset. The idea of establishing integration 
as a ‘contractual obligation’ for migrants indeed became operative after the release 
of the report entitled ‘The Contract and Integration’ [Le contrat et l’intégration], 
which was prepared by the High Council for Integration – HCI [Haut Conseil à 
l'intégration] in 2003.24  Crucially, in the report the HCI addressed mainly the 
youth from ‘difficult neighborhoods’ and women with an immigrant background as 
the priority targets of the contract of integration. Although the HCI, unlike the 
PAVEM in the Netherlands, was not established specifically to address migrant 
women’s issues, the working group that elaborated the long section on gender 
equality was composed mostly of women. Furthermore, the president of the HCI in 
that year was the well-known female philosopher Blandine Kriegel, an advisor to 
Jacques Chirac and strong advocate of the French secularist feminist tradition. The 
prominence assigned to the issue of migrant women’s rights in the context of the 
development of the guidelines on the contract of integration was partly the result of 
the feminization of the issue of migrants’ integration dating from the 1989 
headscarf controversy; but it also sprung from the mobilization of the French state 
feminist apparatus that from the 1990s onwards endorsed the cause of secularism 
as the most important antidote against what they regarded as the rise of religious 
fundamentalism and the consequent oppression of (Muslim) women. Throughout 
the HCI report, the problems of integrating women from a migration background 
[femmes issues de l’immigration] were mainly identified with their lack of access 
to, or knowledge of, their civil rights in relation to issues such as forced marriages, 
polygamy and genital mutilations. Migrant women’s rights were thus strongly 
affirmed in opposition to a stereotypical image of Muslim women in particular as 
victims of gender-based violence stemming from their religious or cultural 
affiliations, as well as from their oppressive family life.  
As article 5 of the 2006 Law reads, “Civic education includes a presentation 
of French institutions and values of the Republic, including equality between men 
and women and secularism”.25 Gender equality is thus given a prominent role as a 
pillar of France, alongside and even listed before what has been defined the 
quintessential value of the French Republic, namely secularism [laïcité]. As aptly 
noted by Eric Fassin, “It is no longer about equality between races, nor between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Lochak, 2006, p. 7. 
25  Law N. 2006-911 of 24 July 2006. The text of the law is available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000266495&dateT
exte=&categorieLien=id  (Last accessed March 18, 2014). 
classes: republican equality has become equality between the sexes”. 26 
Accordingly, the whole integration infrastructure, from the introductory meeting to 
the civic integration session, repeatedly and explicitly mentions equality between 
women and men as a key value of French society and also implicitly conveys 
messages with strong gender dimensions. The integration materials available to 
migrants are mainly of two types: a booklet with a range of general information on 
how to carry on life in France and a video, which is shown to newcomers during 
the introductory session.  
The booklet entitled ‘Living in France’ [Vivre en France], which constituted 
the basis for the civic session, includes everything that migrants are expected to 
follow as part of their contractual obligations. Divided into seven main parts 
(France; work; family; school; health; social life; practical life), equality between 
men and women [l’égalité hommes et femmes] appears in the very first part on the 
institutions of France, right after the introductory section recalling the French 
revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. However, a 
specific interpretation of gender equality emerges from the section devoted to this 
topic. Gender equality is, in fact, mentioned mainly in reference to the family. 
Husband and wife are equal, as the booklet recites, and take important decisions as 
equal partners. For instance, even when the woman does not work, she signs the 
couple’s tax declaration and she does not need her husband’s authorization to work 
or to open a bank account. The booklet also refers to parents’ joint authority over 
children and to their joint role in deciding about their education. The other parts of 
the section refer to freedom of marriage and state that forced marriage and 
polygamy are illegal in France. The section concludes with the following warning: 
“In general, remember that housing conditions and resources of polygamous 
families in France are not conducive to good integration in particular for 
children”.27 The short video ‘Living Together in France’ [Vivre Ensemble, en 
France], which newcomers must view during the introductory meeting, mainly 
repeats the booklet’s contents regarding gender equality in the family. Images of 
French women being occupied in jobs that were traditionally male (the bus driver, 
the member of parliament and so forth) here function as a contrasting background. 
Civic integration policies in France targeted especially family members, who 
constituted 50% of migrants who were granted a residence permit up until 2005.28 
Therefore, like in the Netherlands, whereas the tightening of the criteria for entry 
must be read in light of the new discourse on immigration established by right-
wing governments in the 2000s (one which aimed to stop ‘inflicted immigration’ 
[immigration subie] and to give priority to ‘chosen immigration’ [immigration 
choisie]), the main goal behind the establishment of new policies for integrating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Fassin, 2006, p. 128. 
27 ANAEM, 2007. 
28  Chou and Baygert 2007. 
those who were allowed to enter the country was to turn them into emancipated 
women but also, good mothers.29 As I noted above, the Contract for Reception and 
Integration – CAI [Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration] was followed in 2007 by the 
establishment of an integration contract for the family within the framework of 
family reunification, or CAIF [Contract d’Accueil et d’Integration pour la 
Famille]. Those signing the latter must attend the one-day course on the rights and 
duties of parents; failure to do so can be sanctioned with the cessation of family 
social benefits [allocations familiales] and could lead to a refusal to renew their 
temporary visa [carte de séjour], or to grant their residence permit [carte de 
resident] and even to expulsion from the country.30 As in the Netherlands, in 
France, too, the increasing focus upon the family as the central unit of integration 
stems from the idea, particularly promoted in the 2000s by the right-wing, that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Unlike in the Netherlands, however, training sessions and courses are provided to 
migrants for free and the residence permit is issued on the basis of signing of the contract 
and attending the courses and sessions, rather than through an evaluative exam. Non-
attendance or non-compliance with the contractual obligations (attending the sessions and, 
if needed, the language course) can lead to the termination of the contract and to sanctions 
including the migrant not being granted a permanent residence permit, or the non-renewal 
of the temporary permit and hence expulsion from the country. During my participant 
observation at the Paris OFII office in Rue de la Roquette (March 2013), I was able to 
witness the functioning of the CAI. The contract is presented to immigrants during a half-
day session which is held in one of the OFII offices. During the session, migrants are 
informed about the purpose of the CAI and the half-day schedule, and shown a video about 
French values and lifestyle, “Living Together in France” [Vivre ensemble en France[. 
After the video, a meeting takes place in which each migrant individually receives further 
information on the contract, his/her language skills are evaluated through a 15-minute 
multiple-choice exam, his/her needs are assessed in terms of skills and employability, 
he/she is informed about the dates of the courses and sessions (language courses, if 
applicable, a civic session and a session on life in France). Signing the contract binds the 
migrant to respect the fundamental values of French society and to attend the language 
course and the sessions. While the civic training course lasts six hours and consists of a 
presentation regarding French institutions and values, the session concerning life in France 
has the objective of equipping the CAI signatory with ‘sufficient knowledge’ of practical 
life in terms of access to authorities and services, particularly training, employment, 
housing, health, education and community life. Attendance at both civic training and the 
session about life in France is confirmed by means of attendance certificates released by 
the OFII. At the end of the duration period of the CAI, the OFII issues a certificate 
attesting to compliance or non-compliance with the CAI requirements, including 
evaluation and grades. The certificate is sent to the prefect of the signatory migrant’s place 
of residence. 
30 In France, the immigrant family was initially the only target of the reception platforms 
[plates-formes d’accueil] developed in the 1990s. As I show, it is now the object of a 
specific contractual formula (CAIF). 
failures of ‘multiculturalism’ began in the deviant migrant family.31 The 2005 riots 
for instance, which were invoked as one of the main indicators of problems in the 
integration of second and third-generation migrants in French society, were 
explained by way of the lack of discipline or clear parental roles in migrants’ 
polygamous anomic families.32 Once again thus, migrant women in particular are 
targeted in their role as mothers, or cultural reproducers of the future generations. 
As could be read on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, “Women play an 
essential role within the process of integration, especially of their families and 
children”.33 Yet, the centrality attributed to mothers and their role in the integration 
of children, and the portrayal of integration as an opportunity for them and the 
family, is not without strong ambiguities. Whereas migrant mothers, particularly 
Muslims, are called upon to take responsibility for the integration of their children, 
French schools have also become fortresses that are not accessible to many of 
them, unless they accept to also be ‘like French women’. One of the consequences 
of the 2004 Law banning religious symbols from public schools (read: 
headscarves) has been that of turning the school premises into spaces from which 
migrant Muslim mothers in particular are not welcome. All across France there 
have been numerous cases of veiled women – sometimes of French nationality – 
who were not allowed to enter schools because of their clothing. The gender 
equality rhetoric that informs the civic integration process in France is thus 
traversed by deep contradictions: on the one hand, migrant women are strongly 
encouraged to liberate themselves from patriarchal cultures seemingly preventing 
them from knowing their civil rights; on the other hand, they are invited to be good 
mothers, whereby ‘good motherhood’ means conforming to strictly sanctioned 
models of French parenthood and, above all, womanhood. 
 
Resurrecting the colonial civilizing missions. 
 
Excellent contributions have already pointed to the ‘assimilationist’ 
intentions of civic integration policies, especially in relation to the theme of 
sexuality and women’s rights.34 It is this theme in particular that has come to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Bonjour and de Hart, 2013. 
32 See article by Elaine Sciolino in the New York Times reporting on the numerous cases 
of government representatives citing polygamy as a cause of the French riots of 2005. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/international/europe/17cnd-
france.html?_r=0 (Last accessed March 20, 2014). 
33  See the website of the French Ministry of the Interior: 
http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Accueil-et-accompagnement/Les-femmes-
immigrees/La-politique-d-integration-des-femmes-immigrees (Last accessed March 20, 
2014). 
34 See in particular Ticktin’s article on the deployment of women’s rights against migrant 
communities in France. Ticktin documents the contradictions of the French legislative 
precipitate the “thick public moral” – as Spijkerboer called it – which immigrants 
are not simply expected to know but also to share.35 Furthermore, we should note 
that the images of gender equality conveyed in these materials are built upon and 
predicated on the basis of highly derogatory images of non-western, Muslim 
immigrants’ cultural practices, particularly Muslim practices, thereby essentializing 
culture, victimizing women and putting forward the value of gender equality not 
simply as information that immigrants are required to be acquainted with, but as an 
instance of universal human rights that they must respect and to which they must 
pledge allegiance. Whereas the language of contractualization, as in France, or 
examination, as in the Netherlands, might be designed to speak according to a 
juridical and civic register, asking for mere civic respect and not love for the 
nation, the political language that has pushed these policies forward not only 
explicitly demands love, 36  but is also strongly marked by “ideological 
culturalization” that endorses assimilation as the primary requirement for 
successful integration.37 
This notwithstanding, I would like to take this critique a step further and 
argue that not only are these policies vectors of strong normative injunctions, but 
also that their normative side is further revealing of a nationalist and racist 
repertoire, which can be traced back to a colonial legacy. As I illustrated in both the 
French and the Dutch cases the content of the integration material regarding gender 
equality and women’s rights focuses above all on the family. In France such a 
focus was strongly advocated by the High Council for Integration (HCI) in its 2003 
report entitled ‘The Contract and Integration’ [Le Contrat et l’Integration], which 
provided the guidelines for the implementation of the integration contract (CAI). In 
a long section on the rights of migrant women, the HCI stated that its main 
objective was to advise the legislature on how to enhance these women’s civil 
rights in particular, namely those “rules concerning the person (personality, status, 
capacity), goods (property, ownership and transfer of property), family (birth, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
framework in matters of gender violence and gender discrimination in the case of migrant 
women: she thus argues that, while tolerating the permanence of legal pluralism so that 
non-French women are still subjected to their (often discriminatory) nationality laws on 
issues such as marriage, divorce and parental responsibility, the French state hypocritically 
claims to pursue the rescue of migrant women when it serves its xenophobic agenda. 
Ticktin 2008. 
35 Spijkerboer, 2007; Kirk, 2010. 
36 In 2006 when he was Minister of Interior in de Villepin’s government, Nicholas Sarkozy 
declared: “The first of migrants’ duty is to love the country that welcomes them, and to 
respect its values and its laws. Otherwise, they are not obliged to stay!” 
See article in Liberation. Available at: http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/010146981-
sarkozy-s-adresse-a-nos-compatriotes (Last accessed March 20, 2014). 
37 Alaoui, 2012. 
marriage, patrimonial rights of the family)”.38 According to the HCI, one of the 
most pressing problems that migrant women face in France is the fact that, 
 
the application of the law of nationality in matters of personal status and 
bilateral agreements limit women's rights. The concept of ‘personal 
status’ [statut personnel] established by private international law is that 
the person’s status cannot change even though s/he moves from one 
country to another. (…) This rule, designed to facilitate the return to the 
country of origin, is problematic when applied to persons permanently 
settled in the country of immigration, or who have acquired citizenship 
and do not want to return to their country of origin.39  
 
For the HCI this is particularly concerning because “the conception of 
personal status is profoundly different in Muslim countries as compared to that of 
the French legal framework [droit]: being of religious inspiration, its content is 
more extensive in Muslim legislation [droit]”.40 The “conflict between foreign 
family law, the international agreement signed by France and the fundamental 
values of the Republic”, affects women in particular. That is because, “women are 
placed at the heart of cultural conflicts that they have to take on and overcome in 
order to achieve successful integration into French society”.41 On this basis, the 
HCI recommended, first, to privilege the law of residence [loi du domicile] over 
the law of nationality for immigrants who reside in France on a stable basis; 
second, it advised that the issue of women’s civil rights be assigned sufficient 
space in the contract of integration as to raise women’s awareness of their rights. 
The position of the HCI has had the result of producing “a binary opposition 
between culture and religion on the one hand and human rights and gender equality 
on the other, thereby positing culture and women’s rights as in competition and 
viewing human rights values and gender equality as external to culture”.42 Yet, I 
would like to propose that the centrality of family norms and women’s civil rights 
should be also read in light of the colonial legacy that strongly, albeit implicitly, 
marks the representations of migrant women present in the civic integration 
materials. As Andrez and Spire explain, the conception behind the issue of personal 
status in France is strongly related to its colonial history.  
 
A protective factor for emigrants leaving to conquer distant lands, 
‘personal status’ has become at the same time an issue strongly marked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 HCI 2003, p. 43. 
39 HCI 2003, p. 46. 
40 HCI 2003, p. 46. 
41 HCI 2003, p. 45. 
42 Büchler, 2012, p. 208. On the invocation of culture to account for violence in the case of 
non-western women see also the excellent article by Leti Volpp (2001). 
by colonial law. (…) The exclusion of colonized peoples from French 
citizenship resulted in their retention of the personal religious status to 
which they were subjected. (…) In the first years of colonization in 
Algeria, in 1830, the native Algerians were not subjected to the civil 
code and maintained their personal religious Muslim status (…) Under 
colonial rule, there was therefore legal dualism but according to a 
hierarchy unfavorable to personal status. The colonized certainly did 
have the possibility to have access to French citizenship, but s/he had 
first to renounce his/her Muslim personal status before engaging in a 
process of naturalization that was rarely successful.43  
 
The attempt to put an end to the persistence of Muslim personal religious 
status in Algeria developed in the late 1950s as part of the ‘emancipation strategy’, 
when a range of initiatives were taken with the intention of extending legal rights 
and of ‘liberating’ Muslim women. The initiatives undertaken under the 
‘emancipation strategy’ included the “unveiling campaigns, mobile female medical 
teams in the rural zones (EMSI), improved access to schooling and youth training, 
joint European-Muslim women’s circles, extension of the vote, and a new family 
law”.44 The colonial attempt to impose a new family law to regulate the personal 
status, therefore, was a crucial part of the propaganda machine that legitimated “the 
civilizing mission through a catalogue of supposed barbarism, violence and 
oppression inflicted on Muslim women”.45 Not unlike the recent ban of the Muslim 
headscarf from French public schools, whose fundamental racism has been traced 
back to its colonial legacy,46 I contend thus that the fixation on family norms as 
evident in integration policies is animated by a similar colonial anxiety. (on the 
“anxieties of presence and propriation” in the U.S. settler colonial context in 
relation to processes of indigenous dispossession see Alyosha Goldstein’s essay in 
this volume). In the Netherlands, where the interpellatory character of the contract 
is substituted by the logic of assessment of the integration exam, the theme of 
women’s rights and gender equality is evoked both through the explicit depiction 
of Muslim women as victims of (Islamic) religious based violence and through 
their identification as potential agents of integration once they are moulded into 
properly Dutch mothers.47 Yet it should be emphasized that the moulding process 
which women in particular are required to go through regarding mothering applies 
to those women who have already gone through a selection process in the country 
of origin, namely through the compulsory language and civic integration exam 
abroad. As a matter of fact, this policy targets mostly people applying for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Andrez and Spire, 2001. Available at: http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/51/statut.html  
44 MacMaster, 2007, 94, my emphasis. 
45 MacMaster, 2007, p. 106. 
46 Scott, 2007; Delphy, 2008. 
47 Roggeband, 2010. 
purpose of family reunification as the spouse, partner, parent or child of a person 
who resides in the Netherlands, whereby the majority of applicants are women. 
Furthermore, they apply only to applicants from ‘non-western’ countries, who are 
not following a high-skilled labor migrant and who are sponsored by a family 
member in the Netherlands who has sufficient long-term means of support. 
Commenting on these policies, Sarah van Walsum recalled the words of the 
right-wing nationalist Minister Rita Verdonk – the main initiator of the civic 
integration turn in the country – who advertized these policies as aimed at 
defending Dutch progressive norms regarding sexuality and women’s rights from 
backward family values.48 As van Walsum puts it, “in linking exotic family norms 
and immigration to formulate a compound threat to the Dutch nation, Minister 
Verdonk gave vent to anxieties whose roots ran deeper than the above named 
moments of religiously inspired violence could account for. Her words were in fact 
strikingly reminiscent (…) of the discourse used in colonial times to distinguish the 
Dutch, legally defined as ‘European’, from the ‘native’ inhabitants of the former 
Dutch East Indies”.49 Van Walsum’s compelling analysis shows in particular that 
precisely now that Dutch family norms are very different from what they used to be 
during colonial times, Dutch immigration policies are, conversely, justified in 
terms that closely recall those times.50 This element is detectable in the fact that: 
the granting of visas as well as access to Dutch citizenship are regulated through 
the application of national (racial), moral (sexual) and economic (class) criteria that 
strongly evoke the “colonial technology of race”51 that was used in the Dutch 
colonies to distinguish colonizers from colonized, the members of the Dutch 
imagined community from the aliens. 
 
Dispossessing the private sphere? Concluding notes. 
 
Certainly, the colonial register that clearly marks the French and Dutch 
integration presuppositions and materials, particularly when it comes to regulating 
the Muslim migrant family and women’s rights, is informed by a strong nationalist 
and arguably racist agenda. Taking its lead from discourses and policies concretely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48   In Rita Verdonk’s words: “Failed integration can lead to marginalisation and 
segregation as a result of which people can turn their back on society and fall back on 
antiquated norms and values, making them susceptible to the influence of a small group 
inclined to extremism and terrorism ... Ongoing radicalization implies the real risk that 
non-integrated aliens will take an anti-western stance and will assail fundamental values 
and norms generally accepted in western Society such as equality of men and women, non-
discrimination of homosexuals and freedom of expression” (quoted in van Walsum, 2008, 
p. 6). 
49 van Walsum, 2008, p. 6. 
50 Van Walsum, 2008, p. 7. 
51 Stoler, 1995. 
elaborated during colonial times, the attempt to ‘normalize’ the Muslim family and 
to turn Muslim women into ‘emancipated’ subjects is in fact strictly tied to 
fundamentally racist conceptions of the Other as the uncivilized, whose admission 
into the club of the (western) Europeans lies in his (and particularly) her acceptance 
of the rules and customs of the allegedly more civilized nations. 
Under the assumption that Muslims’ family law and personal status are direct 
expression of the will of monopolisation of the private sphere by religion, the new 
civic integration policies’ focus upon the migrant Muslim family can be seen as the 
Dutch and French governments’ attempt to eliminate them through injunctions 
requiring migrant women to emancipate. The private sphere thus becomes the 
battlefield of the so-called clash between cultures; but also, it becomes the 
privileged terrain for a process of dispossession of migrants’ identity and values 
and re-colonisation in the changed context of European societies.  
Family codes and personal status themselves, however, are the complex 
result of the colonial efforts at privatizing religion. In the case of the law on 
personal status in France, for instance, migrants’ family codes were the result of 
the French colonial attempt at clearly demarcating French citizens from indigenous 
colonial populations requesting the latter to pledge allegiance to the French nation 
in order for them to enjoy its same civil rights in the private sphere. 
Furthermore, albeit presented as measures aiming to ‘emancipate’ Muslim 
migrant women from backward religious customs that relegate them in the role of 
wives and subaltern subjects, civic integration policies have de facto confined these 
women into the equally restrictive role of mothers. Muslim migrant women are 
thus required to be the bearers of the collective that ‘hosts’ them, to become 
cultural, if not immediately biological, reproducers of the European nations. Civic 
integration is thus simultaneously a process of dispossession, de-nationalization 
and re-nationalization, the way to divert Muslim migrant women’s loyalty from the 
non-western nation of origin to the western nation of destination. 
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